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Reversing precedent, the . Court of Appeals of 
Maryland ruled on the 
interpretation of marital settlement 
agreements in Shapiro v. Shapiro, 
346 Md. 648, 697 A.2d 1342 
(1997). The court held that marital 
settlement agreement provisions 
that are subject to modification 
only under certain circumstances 
cannot be modified by a judge 
absent those requirements. 
On May 4, 1988, Debra 
Shapiro and David Shapiro 
entered into a marital settlement 
agreement (the "Agreement"), 
which was later incorporated in 
their judgment of divorce, that 
provided for alimony and child 
support to be paid to Mrs. 
Shapiro. Section 5(e) of the 
Agreement stipulated that the 
alimony payments were not to be 
modified unless Mr. Shapiro 
became temporarily or 
permanently disabled, as defined 
by Mr. Shapiro's insurance policy. 
Sixteen months after the 
divorce, Mr. Shapiro petitioned the 
Circuit Court for Howard County 
for a rescission or modification of 
the Agreement. The court refused 
to rescind the Agreement but held 
that the provisions regarding 
alimony were subject to court 
modification in spite of the express 
provision in the Agreement that 
permitted modification only if Mr. 
Shapiro became disabled. 
The trial court based its 
holding on Langley v. Langley, 88 
Md. App. 535, 596 A.2d 89 
(1991), where the' Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held that 
section 8-103(c)(2) of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland, 













By Amy B. Tate 
Family Law Article required a 
specific provision stating that the 
marital settlement agreement is 
not subject to any court 
modification. Thus, any agreement 
without that specific language 
would be subject to judicial 
modification. 
The court of special appeals 
ruled that section 5(e) of the 
marital settlement agreement did 
not comply with the Lang/ey rule. 
The court of appeals granted 
certiorari to determine whether 
section 8-103(c)(2) requires 
spousal support provisions to be 
completely modifiable or 
completely non-modifiable and 
whether a court can rewrite a 
marital settlement agreement 
which is part of an enrolled 
judgment, absent fraud or 
mistake. 
The court began its analysis 
by examining the text of section 8-
103(c)(2), MD. CODE ANN., FAM. 
LAw (1991). The court noted that 
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the term "provision" is used both in 
the singular and the plural. Id. at 
655, 697 A.2d at 1345. Pursuant 
to the statute, a "provision" may 
be included in a marital settlement 
agreement for the purpose of 
addressing "provisions with 
respect to alimony or spousal 
support are not subject to any 
court modification." Id. at 656, 697 
A.2d 1346 (citing MD. CODE ANN., 
FAM. LAW § 8-103(c)(2)(1991». 
The circuit court interpreted the 
latter phrase to include all 
prOVIsions regarding spousal 
support, a position which Mr. 
Shapiro said could be justified by 
the use of the singular in 
reference to the modification 
provision. Id. at 656, 697 A.2d at 
1346. 
While Mr. Shapiro advocated 
this bright line approach, Ms. 
Shapiro contended that 
modifiability should be determined 
provision by provision and that the 
lower courts should have adopted 
that construction. Id. Rather than 
choosing either version, the court 
referred to Article I, section 8 of 
the Rules of I nterpretation which 
states that "[t]he singular always 
includes the plural, and vice 
versa." Id. at 657, 697 A.2d at 
1346 (quoting MD. CODE. ANN. art. 
1 § 8(1996». The court found that 
either way, the statute is still 
ambiguous regarding court 
modification. Id. 
The court then turned to the 
legislative history of section 8-103. 
It observed that subsections (b) 
and (c) of section 8-103 were 
enacted to correct technical 
barriers to divorcing parties that 
prevented inclusion of their 
express intent in marital 
28.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 45 
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settlement agreements. Id. at 
658, 697 A.2d 1347. Subsection 
8-103(b) was enacted in 1975 to 
nullify the rule of Simpson v. 
Simpson. Id. (citing Simpson v. 
Simpson, 18 Md. App. 626, 308 
A.2d 410 (1973». In Simpson, the 
court of special appeals ruled that 
a court could modify technical 
alimony but not contractual 
spousal sLipport. Id. The 
General Assembly responded with 
Chapter 849 of the Acts of 1975 
which stated: 
"the court shall have the right 
to modify such deed or 
agreement ... regardless of 
the manner in which the 
provisions are expressed or 
stated unless the provisions 
... specifically state that they 
are not subject to any court 
modification." 
Id. at 659, 697 A.2d at 1347 
(quoting MD. ANN CODE. art. 16 
§28 (1973». 
This provision was in effect for the 
first three months of 1976, after 
which it was replaced by Chapter 
170 of the Acts of 1976. Id. at 
659,697 A.2d at 1347-48. Unlike 
the prior statute, the 1976 Act 
restricted the court's ability to 
modify the settlement agreement 
provisions concerning spousal 
support to those agreements in 
which there were no express 
waiver or statements specifically 
precluding court modification. Id. 
at 660, 697 A.2d at1348. 
In 1984, the Family Law Article 
was revised and the acts of 1975 
and 1976 were adopted as 
sections 8-103(b) and 8-103(c). 
The court suggested that the 1984 
code Revisors' use of the phrase 
"unless there is" in the sections 
addressing modification or waiver 
of spousal support necessitated a 
28.1 U. Bait. L.F. 46 
grammatical change from plural to 
singular. Id. at 661, 697 A.2d at 
1349. As such, the court found no 
justification for the lower court's 
bright line construction of section 
8-103(c)(2). Id. at 662,697 A.2d 
at 1349. The court proffered that 
the grammatical change indicated 
the legislature did not consider the 
consequences of the new 
language. Id. In addition, the 
Revisor's Note indicated no 
substantive change was intended. 
Id. As a result, the court then 
focused on the General 
Assembly's intent in enacting the 
provision. Id. at 663, 697 A.2d at 
1349. 
In enacting section 8-
103(c)(2), the court noted, the 
legislature sought to permit judicial 
modification of contractual 
support, unless otherwise agreed 
by the spouses. Id. The 
distinction between technical 
alimony and contractual support 
would no longer contradict the 
parties intent. Id. By requiring a 
"blanket provision" that prevents 
modification of spousal support 
provisions except in an all or 
nothing manner, the court opined, 
"the evil that the General 
Assembly sought to cure by 8-
103(c)(2) is recreated." Id. at 663, 
697 A.2d at 1349-50. In fact, the 
court found no support for the 
continuation of the all or nothing 
approach. Id. 
The court supported its 
conclusion by referring to decades 
of public policy recognizing the 
ability of a husband and a wife to 
enter into an agreement relating to 
alimony and support. Id. at 663-
64, 697 A.2d at 1350. It further 
stated that "[t)he broad, validating 
approach of § 8-101(a) is 
inconsistent with restrictively 
reading § 8-1 03( c)(2) to require 
that the contractual support 
provisions . .. be modifiable or 
non-modifiable as a class." Id. at 
664, 697 A.2d at 1350. 
The court of appeals refuted 
Mr. Shapiro's assertion that the 
legislature preferred the all or 
nothing approach so as to allow 
the application of factors for 
setting spousal support under 
section 11-106(b) of the Family 
Law Article. Id. at 665, 697 A.2d 
at 1350-51. Those factors include 
the existence of "any agreement 
between the parties" and "the 
financial resources and financial 
needs of each party". Id. (quoting 
MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAW §11-
106(b». The court pointed out 
that a court would be free to apply 
those factors "if and when that 
other circumstance occurs and the 
parties come to the court for 
modification." Id. 
After applying the rules of 
statutory construction, the court 
found the legislative history to be 
inconsistent with the all or nothing 
approach. Id. The court held that 
the alimony provisions in the 
Shapiro agreement could not be 
judicially modified because Mr. 
Shapiro was not disabled. Id. at 
665, 697 A.2d at 1351. As a 
result, the court overturned 
Langley as it was inconsistent with 
its present finding that provisions 
could be individually exempted 
from modification by the court. Id. 
The court of appeals also 
addressed the circuit court's 
conversion of the Agreement's 
alimony provisions to child support 
provIsions. Id. at 665-66, 697 
A.2d at 1351. Because the 
Agreement was incorporated into 
the judgment for divorce, the court 
observed that it could only be 
modified in the case of fraud, 
mistake, or irregularity. Id. at 666, 
697 A.2d at 1351 (citing Maryland 
Rule 2-535(b». While section 8-
1 05(b) does permit retroactive 
modification of a divorce decree, 
the section only applies to 
provisions subject to modification 
under section 8-103. Id. Since 
the court's holding prevented 
modification of the alimony 
provision under section 8-103, the 
power to modify the Shapiro's 
decree could not be invoked under 
section 8-105(b). Id. The court 
remanded the case to the circuit 
court on the issue of child support 
because the decrease in child 
support was offset by alimony 
payments, now impermissible 
under the court's holding. Id. 
The Shapiro decision 
represents a dramatic shift in the 
interpretation of family law. In 
overturning Langley, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland created 
greater flexibility in the drafting of 
mar.ital settlement agreements in 
Maryland. By removing the 
restrictive interpretation of 
Langley, spousal support 
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provisions can be crafted to meet 
a number of contingencies under 
which modification of support may 
occur. In addition, the Shapiro 
decision is consistent with the 
legislative purpose of section 8-
1 03( c)(2): to eliminate the 
technical difficulties of contracts 
between spouses. As a result, 
family law practitioners may 
consider future possibilities for the 
husband and wife, without fear 
that the product of their 
negotiations will be subject to 
judicial modification. 
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